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WISCONSIN'S CAPS ON NONECONOMIC
DAMAGES IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
CASES:
WHERE WISCONSIN STANDS (AND SHOULD
STAND) ON "TORT REFORM"
I. INTRODUCTION
Every so often, the fine line that separates law from politics blurs, even
erodes, before the public's very eyes. Some might say that this line has
disappeared or that it never existed in the first place. But in either case,
medical negligence law has been making a lot of noise lately, and it is making
this line ever difficult to draw. States around the country have pushed forth
"tort reform" agendas, controlling the nature and extent to which victims of
medical malpractice may be compensated for their injuries.1 Should judges
and juries ensure that victims of negligence are fully and fairly compensated,
upholding one of the most basic pillars of the American legal system? Or
should they defer to legislatures, who have enacted laws that redefine the
boundaries of this basic pillar?
These questions are not only difficult to answer, but their depth and
breadth underscores just how expansive and intense the debate has become.
In fact, the controversy over tort reform in the context of medical negligence
has pushed itself to the front of the medical community's attention; "medical
liability reform" is currently a central piece of the American Medical
Association's (AMA) advocacy agenda. The issue will not go away anytime
soon, and the stakes are increasing by the minute.
At the heart of this dispute is the imposition of limits (or "caps") on
noneconomic damages 3 in medical malpractice cases. Legislatures often
1. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. III, § 66(b); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.118(2)(a) (West 2005); WIs.
STAT. § 893.55(4)(d) (2003-2004) (limiting recovery of noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice cases to $350,000, to be adjusted by the director of state courts); CAL. CIVIL CODE §
3333.2(b) (West 1997).
2. Am. Med. Ass'n, American Medical Association Home Page, http://www.ama-assn.org (last
visited on Jan. 5, 2006).
3. For the purpose of medical malpractice cases, Wisconsin has defined "noneconomic
damages" to mean "pain and suffering; humiliation; embarrassment; worry; mental distress;
noneconomic effects of disability including loss of enjoyment of the normal activities, benefits and
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conclude that by setting a maximum amount that can be recovered for
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases, at least three things will
happen: medical malpractice insurance premiums will improve, the cost to
health care will stabilize, and health care will become more accessible.4 In
essence, the argument suggests that damage caps will resolve the nation's
health care "crisis." Many states, including Wisconsin, have bought into this
line of reasoning and have proscribed a maximum amount of recovery for
noneconomic damages in a medical malpractice action.5  Congress has
recently taken steps in a similar direction,6 although no federal limit has yet
been enacted.
Legal challenges to the constitutional validity of these limits are a matter
of when, not if. Indeed, such challenges have been successful in a variety of
instances, with Wisconsin being a prime example. 7 This recent activity will
be discussed in Part II of this Comment, which provides a history of medical
malpractice caps in Wisconsin. Part III will discuss similar histories in other
states, while Part IV will compare Wisconsin's stance to these other states.
Finally, in Part V, I will discuss what stance Wisconsin should take on this
issue.
II. LIMITS ON NONECONOMIC DAMAGES IN WISCONSIN
The history of tort reform in Wisconsin can arguably be described as a
process of trial and error. Wisconsin's initial support to change medical
negligence law can be traced back to the 1970s, when the Wisconsin
Legislature made its first effort to deal with medical malpractice actions.
8
This effort crystallized in 1975 when Wisconsin created Chapter 37 "in
pleasures of life and loss of mental or physical health, well-being or bodily functions; loss of
consortium, society and companionship; or loss of love and affection." WIS. STAT. § 893.55(4)(a)
(2003-2004).
4. The term "crisis," as it relates to health care in this context, generally refers to rising medical
malpractice insurance premiums, the cost of health care, and access to health care. Any further use
of the word "crisis" in the context of medical negligence law refers to the state of these three general
components of health care.
5. WIS. STAT. § 893.55(4)(d) (2003-2004) (limiting recovery of noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice cases to $350,000, to be adjusted by the director of state courts); see also Am.
Med. Ass., supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., H.R. 4280, 108th Cong. (2004). (Section 4(b) of this bill proposes a $250,000
limit on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases).
7. See, e.g., Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125, 284 Wis. 2d
573, 701 N.W.2d 440; Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (111. 1997) (striking down
limits on noneconomic damages).
8. Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, T 49, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 49, 682 N.W.2d 866, 49.
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response to a perceived economic and social crisis." 9 While this legislation
did not establish limits on noneconomic damages as so many tort reform laws
do today,' it "created a Patients Compensation Fund to pay medical
malpractice awards"" and established "a procedure for addressing medical
malpractice."'
2
The legislation was not successful, and the Wisconsin Legislature decided
that something else had to be done. 13  As a result, efforts to make new
changes ensued in the mid-1980s, particularly with the proposal of Senate Bill
328 in 1985.14 This bill proposed a $3.3 million cap on total damages in
medical malpractice actions. 15  When this legislation did not pass, the
Wisconsin Legislature turned its efforts to Wisconsin Act 340.16 Wisconsin
Act 340, enacted in 1986, established statutory limits on noneconomic
damages for medical malpractice cases. 17  This initial limit was set at $1
million-much more plaintiff-friendly than in recent years, but a cap
nonetheless. 18
By its own terms, however, this initial cap expired on January 1, 1991.'9
Thus, Wisconsin had several years to decide whether tort reform was effective
in Wisconsin for that period of time. In 1994, Wisconsin thought that it was;
"a Special Committee of the Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund
recommended" a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages for medical
malpractice cases.20  The Wisconsin Legislature agreed with that concept,
passing Wisconsin Act 10 in 1995.21 Wisconsin Act 10 brought back a cap
on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases, setting a limit of
9. State ex. rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 261 N.W.2d 434, 443 (Wis. 1978); Maurin, 2004 WI
100, 79 49-50, 274 Wis. 2d 28, T 49-50, 682 N.W.2d 866, 7 49-50.
10. Maurin, 2004 WI 100, 51,274 Wis. 2d 28, 51, 682 N.W.2d 866, 51.
11. Id., T 50, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 50, 682 N.W.2d 866, T 50.
12. Id., N 51, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 51,682 N.W.2d 866, 51.
13. Id., 53, 274 Wis. 2d 28, T 53, 682 N.W.2d 866, 53 (discussing the legislative history of
damage caps in Wisconsin).
14. Id., 274 Wis. 2d 28, 1 53,682 N.W.2d 866, 53.
15. S.B. 328, 1985 Sen. (Wis. 1985); see also Maurin, 2004 WI 100, 53, 274 Wis. 2d 28,
53, 682 N.W.2d 866, 53.
16. See generally Maurin, 2004 WI 100, 7 55-60, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 7 55-60, 682 N.W.2d 866,
7 55-60 (the "1986 legislation" the court refers to is Wisconsin Act 340, which was enacted in June
of 1986).
17. Act of June 12, 1986, No. 340, § 72, 1986 Wis. Sess. Laws 1497, 1511-15; see generally
Maurin, 2004 WI 100, 55-60, 274 Wis. 2d 28, TT 55-60, 682 N.W.2d 866, 55-60.
18. Act of June 12, 1986, No. 340, § 72, 1986 Wis. Sess. Laws 1497, 1511-15; see also
Maurin, 2004 WI 100, 60, 274 Wis, 2d 28, 60, 682 N.W.2d 866, 60.
19. Act of June 12, 1986, No. 340, § 30, 1986 Wis. Sess. Laws 1497, 1504; see also Maurin,
2004 WI 100, 64, 274 Wis. 2d 28, T 64, 682 N.W.2d 866, 64.
20. Maurin, 2004 WI 100, 66, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 66, 682 N.W.2d 866, 66.
21. Id., 67, 274 Wis. 2d 28, T 67, 682 N.W.2d 866, T 67.
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$350,000.22 Undoubtedly, Wisconsin has viewed restrictions on medical
malpractice actions as a legitimate means to control health care costs and
insurance rates.
A. Initial Challenges and the Guzman Decision
While the Wisconsin Legislature seemingly was satisfied with its new,
more restrictive approach to medical negligence, Wisconsin plaintiff lawyers
and medical malpractice victims were not. As a result, like most other states
that have enacted similar limits, Wisconsin's caps were challenged in court.23
Unfortunately for Wisconsin plaintiffs, this challenge initially did not fall on
sympathetic ears.24 At the time, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not even
consider these challenges worthy of review. 25
What are the foundations of these challenges? In Wisconsin (and
throughout the country generally), there are several theories that plaintiffs
have used to try to strike down these caps.26 These theories typically include,
in one form or another, a violation of (1) the right to trial by jury; (2)
separation of powers; (3) equal protection; (4) due process; and (5) state-
specific constitutional provisions.
27
The first challenge presented to damage caps is the contention that
limiting the amount of damages one may recover is tantamount to violating
one's right to a jury trial.28 If the jury's decision is set aside for an arbitrary,
pre-set limit, the argument goes, it is the same as taking away the essence of a
plaintiff's right to try his or her case in front of a jury in the first place.
Article I, section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that the right to
a jury trial "shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without
regard to the amount in controversy., 29 Medical malpractice plaintiffs have
interpreted this to mean that the legislature cannot "substitute its judgment for
that of the jury as to the proper amount of damages owing to a victim of
22. Act of May 10, 1995, No. 10, § 9, 1995 Wis. Sess. Laws 8, 10 (codified at Wis. STAT. §
893.55(4)(d) (2003-2004)).
23. Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp., 2001 WI App 21, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 623 N.W.2d 776.
24. See, e.g., id., 240 Wis. 2d 559, 623 N.W.2d 776 (upholding limits on noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice cases).
25. Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp., 2001 WI 43, 242 Wis. 2d 543, 623 N.W.2d 783 (denying
plaintiff's petition for review to the Wisconsin Supreme Court).
26. See, e.g., Guzman, 2001 WI App 21, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 623 N.W.2d 776.
27. See, e.g., id., 240 Wis. 2d 559, 623 N.W.2d 776.
28. See id., 6, 240 Wis. 2d 559,1 6, 623 N.W.2d 776,116.
29. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 5; Guzman, 2001 WI App 21, 6, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 1 6, 623 N.W.2d
776, 6.
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medical malpractice. 3 °
However, in Guzman v. St. Francis Hospital,3' the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals was swift to reject this argument. 32 In Guzman, the patient-plaintiff
alleged that she was seriously injured by the negligence of her health care
providers.33 After trial, the trial court held that the cap on noneconomic
damages was unconstitutional because it violated the right to trial by jury.34
On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals ruled that these caps do nothing
of the sort.35 Rather, according to the appellate court's reasoning, the
legislature has always had the power to set the parameters of legal rights; 36
the Wisconsin Constitution itself allows the legislature to do SO. 3 7 In addition,
the court points out, Wisconsin has already upheld the applicable statute of
repose in medical malpractice cases.38  Surely, the court suggests, if the
legislature has the power to bar claims entirely after an arbitrary amount of
time, then the legislature should also have the power to limit recovery above
an arbitrary limit.
39
A second major challenge to damage caps is often founded on the
separation of powers doctrine. 40 The plaintiff in Guzman argued that the cap
undermines the judiciary's power to order a remittitur and thus violates the
separation of powers between the courts and the legislature. 41 However, the
court explained, the statutory limit on noneconomic damages does not do this;
the trial court may still order a remittitur if it so chooses.42 Therefore, even if
the cap was to be considered a legislative remittitur, "it represents a sharing
of powers between the branches," rather than a violation of the separation of
30. Guzman, 2001 Wi App 21, 7 7, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 1 7, 623 N.W.2d 776, 7.
31. 2001 Wl App 21, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 623 N.W.2d 776.
32. Id., T 12, 240 Wis. 2d 559, T 12, 623 N.W.2d 776, 1 12.
33. Id., 240 Wis. 2d 559, 12, 623 N.W.2d 776, 12.
34. Id., 3, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 3, 623 N.W.2d 776, T 3.
35. Id., 7 10-12, 240 Wis. 2d 559, TT 10-12, 623 N.W.2d 776, 77 10-12.
36. Id., 11,240 Wis. 2d 559, 11,623 N.W.2d 776, 7 11.
37. Id., T 7, 240 Wis. 2d 559, T 7, 623 N.W.2d 776, 7 (quoting Wis. CONST. art. XIV, § 13
("Such parts of the common law.., shall be and continue part of the law of this state until altered or
suspended by the legislature.")).
38. Guzman, 2001 WI App 21, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 623 N.W.2d 776 (citing and discussing
Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849 (Wis. 2000)).
39. See Guzman, 2001 WI App 21, 1 12, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 12, 623 N.W.2d 776, $ 12.
40. Id., 13, 240 Wis. 2d 559, T 13, 623 N.W.2d 776, 13.
41. Id., 13, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 13, 623 N.W.2d 776, T 13. Essentially, this argument is based
on the foundation that the legislature has already ordered a remittitur for rewards that are higher than
the statutory limit, and thus violates Powers v. Allstate Insurance Co., 102 N.W.2d 393 (Wis. 1960)
(holding that trial courts have the power to order remittitur).
42. Id., 240 Wis. 2d 559, 13,623 N.W.2d 776, 1 13.
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powers.43
Equal Protection challenges also threaten the constitutional validity of
medical malpractice caps.44 In Guzman, for instance, the patient-plaintiff
alleged that the cap on noneconomic damages violated equal protection in
four ways: (1) it "creates two classes of tort litigation plaintiffs," those injured
by medical malpractice of a health-care provider and those injured by a
health-care provider but not by medical malpractice; (2) it "creates two
classes of victims," those who sustained damages higher than the cap and
those who sustained damages lower than the cap; (3) it creates two classes of
tortfeasors (those who caused noneconomic damage in excess of the cap and
those who caused noneconomic damage that is lower than the cap) and grants
immunity to those who have caused the most noneconomic damage; and (4) it
penalizes those who will have to share noneconomic damages with a spouse
or minors because the cap applies to each occurrence, rather than to each
plaintiff.
45
Guzman dealt with these challenges by first noting that these distinctions
do not involve fundamental rights or suspect classes as used in equal
protection analysis, and thus the statute is constitutional so long as the
legislature's decision is rational.46 In Guzman, this distinction is crucial; the
patient-plaintiff asserted that "strict scrutiny" applies (as it would have if a
"fundamental right" or "suspect class" had been involved), and the court
viewed the plaintiff's silence on the "rational basis test" analysis as a
concession that the cap passes that test. 47 The court does not suggest how that
test would be met if the court would be confronted with the issue, which
becomes interesting in 2005, discussed later.
Another challenge to caps on noneconomic damages is a substantive due
process challenge. The plaintiffs in Guzman argued that substantive due
process "required the legislature to give ...plaintiffs a 'quid pro quo' in
return for taking away the right to recover more than $350,000 . .. in
noneconomic damages. 48  The court brushed off this argument; since the
Guzman's claim accrued after the cap had already been enacted, there was no
substantive right to unlimited damages.49
Plaintiffs also often challenge these damage caps on grounds of some
violation of certain provisions in various state constitutions. In Wisconsin,
43. Id., 240 Wis. 2d 559, 13, 623 N.W.2d 776, 13 (emphasis in original).
44. Id., 19, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 19, 623 N.W.2d 776, 19.
45. Id., 240 Wis. 2d 559, 19, 623 N.W.2d 776, 1 19.
46. Id., 120, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 20, 623 N.W.2d 776, 20.
47. Id., 21, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 21, 623 N.W.2d 776, 21.
48. Id., 1 22, 240 Wis. 2d 559, T 22, 623 N.W.2d 776, 1 22.
49. Id., 24, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 24, 623 N.W.2d 776, 24.
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this provision is article I, section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution. This
section generally provides that everybody is entitled to a certain remedy for
all injuries. 50  However, as with the other challenges, this challenge was
quickly dismissed in Guzman. As the Wisconsin Court of Appeals put it,
"Section 9 'confers no legal rights."'' 51 In addition, the court of appeals in
Guzman emphasized that if a statute of repose does not violate the "remedy-
for-wrongs" clause, then a mere limit on collectable damages certainly
cannot.52
B. Wisconsin Medical Malpractice Law Turned Upside-Down; The
Ferdon Decision
After the Guzman decision in 2000, it seemed clear that Wisconsin's
medical malpractice damage caps were staying put. The Wisconsin Court of
Appeals had upheld the caps without breaking a sweat, and the Wisconsin
Supreme Court chose not to review the case. The trial-and-error history
seemed to have come to a definite conclusion, at least for the foreseeable
future.
What a difference a few years can make; in 2005, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court reviewed this issue in Ferdon ex. rel. Petrucelli v. Wisconsin Patients
Compensation Fund.53 Plaintiff attorneys and medical malpractice victims
throughout the state crossed their fingers, hoping that a fresh set of eyes-
both figuratively and literally-would result in a different conclusion than the
Guzman court reached. 4
The facts of Ferdon will probably not surprise plaintiff lawyers. The
patient-plaintiff, through his guardian ad litem, alleged medical malpractice
50. The exact language of article I, section 9 is as follows:
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or
wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought to
obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and
without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws.
51. Guzman, 2001 WI App 21, T 18, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 118, 623 N.W.2d 776, 18 (quoting
Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, 1 43, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 43, 613 N.W.2d 849,
43).
52. Id., 240 Wis. 2d 559, T 18, 623 N.W.2d 776, 18.
53. 2005 WI 125,284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440.
54. There was "literally" a fresh set of eyes because between the time the Guzman and Ferdon
decisions were published, the makeup of the Wisconsin Supreme Court had changed: Justice William
Bablitch left the court in 2003, and Justice Diane Sykes left the court in 2004. They were replaced
by Justice Patience Roggensack and Justice Louis Butler, respectively. See generally Wisconsin
Supreme Court System-Supreme Court Justices, http://www.courts.state.wi.us/about/judges/supre-
me/index.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2005).
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during birth that resulted in partial paralysis and deformity of his right arm.55
Among other damages, the jury awarded the plaintiff $700,000 in
noneconomic damages, easily exceeding the statutory cap proscribed in
section 893.44(d) of the Wisconsin Statutes. 56  The Wisconsin Patients
Compensation Fund moved to reduce the noneconomic damage award to the
capped limit, the circuit court concurred, and the appellate court affirmed.
57
The plaintiff-patient appealed.
58
Unlike after the Guzman decision, however, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court agreed to hear the case. The arguments, however, were generally the
same; the plaintiff-patient in Ferdon, as in Guzman, alleged that the caps
violated (1) equal protection, (2) his right to trial by jury, (3) the right-to-
remedy provision of article I, section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution, (4) the
due process clause of the Wisconsin Constitution, and (5) the separation of
powers doctrine.59
The court's decision focused entirely on the equal protection argument,
and thus the other four arguments were never discussed. In fact, the Ferdon
court generally agreed with the Guzman court "that rational basis, not strict
scrutiny, is the appropriate level of scrutiny in the present case.",61 As one
may recall, the Guzman court did not bother to consider whether the caps pass
rational review.62 Interestingly, the Ferdon court somewhat clouds the issue
of scrutiny by discussing different, more stringent variations of rational
review (such as "rational basis with teeth"), and notes that "[w]hether the
level of scrutiny is called rational basis, rational basis with teeth, or
meaningful rational basis, it is this standard we now apply in this case. 63
In any event, the court makes clear that caps on damages do create certain
classifications 64 and that these classifications must be "rationally related to
achieving appropriate legislative objectives" if they are to be deemed valid.65
The court identified the overall legislative objective as ensuring "the quality
55. Ferdon, 2005 WI 125, 19, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 19, 701 N.W.2d 440, 19.
56. Id., T 21,284 Wis. 2d 573, T 21,701 N.W.2d 440, 721.
57. Id., TT 22-23, 284 Wis. 2d 573, TT 22-23, 701 N.W.2d 440, 79 22-23.
58. Id., T 23, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 23, 701 N.W.2d 440, T 23.
59. Id., 9, 284 Wis. 2d 573, $ 9, 701 N.W.2d 440, 9.
60. Id., 10, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 710, 701 N.W.2d 440, 10.
61. Id., 765, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 65, 701 N.W.2d 440, 65.
62. See Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp., 2001 WI 43, T 21, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 21, 623 N.W.2d.
783, $ 21.
63. Ferdon, 2005 WI 125, 80, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 80, 701 N.W.2d 440, 1 80.
64. Id., T$ 81-82, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 99 81-82, 701 N.W.2d 440, TT 81-82 ("The main
classification is the distinction between medical malpractice victims who suffer over S350,000 in
noneconomic damages, and [those] who suffer less ....").
65. Id., $ 85, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 85, 701 N.W.2d 440, T 85.
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of health care for the people of Wisconsin, 66 while identifying five
interconnected objectives: (1) ensuring adequate compensation for medical
malpractice victims, (2) lower malpractice insurance premiums, (3) protecting
the Fund's financial status, (4) reducing overall health care costs, and (5)
"[e]ncourag[ing] health care providers to practice in Wisconsin., 67
That the court identified certain classifications of victims and enumerated
these particular legislative goals is not surprising; advocates on both sides of
the debate would find these identifications familiar. What is interesting,
however, is how meticulous the court was in analyzing the "rational
relationship" between the cap and the legislative objectives, particularly the
relationship between the cap and medical malpractice insurance rates. For
example, the court cites Martin v. Richards,68 and studies discussed therein,
suggesting that there is evidence indicating that the cap affects very few
victims and may not have much of an effect on insurance rates. 69 The court
also discusses a General Accounting Office report that finds "premiums...
are affected by multiple factors in addition to damage caps," and notes that
"Minnesota, which has no caps on damages, has relatively low growth in
premium rates and claims payments. 70
Sparing the reader further detail, it would suffice to say that the court is
similarly meticulous in its analysis of each of the other four identified
legislative objectives, constantly citing facts and figures suggesting that the
objectives do not rationally relate to the classifications created by the cap.71
Ultimately, all of this analysis is done to back up the court's holding that "the
$350,000 cap . . .violates the equal protection guarantees of the Wisconsin
Constitution., 72 While it is possible that "caps on noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice cases, or statutory caps in general, can be
constitutional[,]y 73 for the present and immediate future, such caps are
66. Id., 7 89, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 85, 701 N.W.2d 440, 89.
67. Id., 77 91-95, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 7% 91-95, 701 N.W.2d 440, 7 91-95.
68. 531 N.W.2d 70 (Wis. 1995).
69. See generally Ferdon, 2005 WI 125, T$ 117-19, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 117-19, 701 N.W.2d
440, T$ 117-19.
70. Id., 7 125, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 125, 701 N.W.2d 440, 125.
71. For example, among other facts and statistics, the court cited a 1992 report by the
Wisconsin Office of the Commissioner of Insurance, see id., $ 99, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 99, 701
N.W.2d 440, 99; the published and hindsight surplus of the Fund from Fiscal Years 1979-2004, see
id., $ 142, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 7 142, 701 N.W.2d 440, 142; the Legislative Fiscal Bureau's report to
the Joint Committee on Finance, see id., T 143, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 143, 701 N.W.2d 440, T 143; and
a Congressional Budget Office report regarding medical malpractice premiums and health care costs,
see id., 163 n.219, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 163 n.219, 701 N.W.2d 440, 163 n.219.
72. Id., 10, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 10, 701 N.W.2d 440, 10.
73. Id., $ 189, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 189, 701 N.W.2d 440, 7 189 (Crooks, J., concurring).
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unconstitutional in Wisconsin.74
Given Wisconsin's up-and-down history regarding damage caps in
medical malpractice cases, one wonders what kind of chaos has existed in
other states throughout the country. How have these caps been dealt with
across the country? Are states typically more decisive than Wisconsin? Or
do many other states also struggle with the issue?
III. LIMITS ON NONECONOMIC DAMAGES-How HAVE OTHER STATES
TACKLED "TORT REFORM"?
The positions taken by other states across the country suggest that
Wisconsin's take on medical liability limits is not necessarily indicative of the
nation's view on the matter. A number of other courts have dealt with similar
issues of validity, reaching varying conclusions. Three states in particular
have played an interesting role in the development of medical negligence
law-California, Texas, and Illinois.
For starters, it is difficult to overestimate the impact that California has
had on the tort reform debate. For one, California's current cap on
noneconomic damages has been in place since 1975--one of the longest-
lasting limits of any state.75 Even more, California's cap has been the prized
possession of tort reform supporters, who point to California's law to prove
their point that "tort reform works.",
76
The eye-opening event that stands out in California's history of tort
reform is the passage of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of
1975, more commonly referred to as MICRA.77 Former California Governor
Jerry Brown was instrumental in this development. 78  "[C]iting serious
problems that had arisen throughout the state as a result of a rapid increase in
74. A new cap of $750,000 has already been passed and signed by Governor Jim Doyle;
however, it remains to be seen whether this cap will survive constitutional challenges. Stacey
Forster, Doyle Signs Medical Liability Cap, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 23, 2006, at Al.
75. Martin D. Weiss, Melissa Gannon & Stephanie Eakins, Medical Malpractice Caps: The
Impact of Non-Economic Damage Caps on Physician Premiums, Claims Payout Levels, and
Availability of Coverage, WEISS RATINGS, INC. 5 (June 2003), http://www.weissratings.com/Medica-
lMalpractice.pdf.
76. See Am. Med. Ass'n, America's Medical Liability Crisis 2 (March 2004), http://www.ama-
assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/399/mlr-tp.pdf. The quote "tort reform works" is the author's
description of this position.
77. While MICRA contains several provisions relating to medical negligence law, the cap on
noneconomic damages can be found in section 3333.2(b) of the California Civil Code. ("In no
[medical malpractice] action shall the amount of damages for noneconomic losses exceed two
hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000)").
78. See Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Cmty. Hosp., 683 P.2d 670, 672 (Cal. 1984).
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medical malpractice insurance premiums[, the governor] convened the
Legislature in extraordinary session to consider measures aimed at remedying
the situation."79 MICRA was the product of this special session. 80 Among
other notable changes to California's medical negligence laws, MICRA
proscribed a maximum recovery of $250,000 for noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice cases, 8' an amount that has gone unchanged since
MICRA was passed. 82
The validity of the cap provision in MICRA was challenged in Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group.83  In Fein, the plaintiff challenged the cap's
validity on grounds of substantive due process and equal protection, with both
arguments being similar to the plaintiffs arguments in Guzman.84 Like the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals, the California Supreme Court dismissed these
arguments with ease.85 Because both substantive due process and equal
protection arguments depend largely upon the standard of scrutiny applied,
the court begins each analysis by noting that both arguments must meet only
"rational basis" review. 86
Since the court was confronted with two constitutional challenges, and
both revolve around "rational basis" review, the court had an easy time
holding the caps to be valid. Unlike the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the
California Supreme Court found the link between the legislative interest
(reducing malpractice insurance premiums and improving the cost and access
to health care) and the cap on noneconomic damages to be crystal clear. The
court explained:
In attempting to reduce the cost of medical malpractice
insurance in MICRA, the Legislature enacted a variety of
provisions.... Section 3333.2 ... [is] one of the provisions
which made changes in existing tort rules in an attempt to
reduce the cost of medical malpractice litigation, and thereby
restrain the increase in medical malpractice insurance
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Stephen K. Meyer, The California Statutory Cap on Noneconomic Damages In Medical
Malpractice Claims: Implications on the Right to a Trial by Jury, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1197,
1198 (1992).
82. See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3333.2(b) (West 2004).
83. 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985).
84. Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 679-83 (Cal. 1985).
85. Id.
86. "So long as the measure is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, policy
determinations as to the need for, and the desirability of, the enactment are for the Legislature." Id.
at 679 (quoting Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Cmty. Hosp., 683 P.2d 670, 676 (Cal. 1984)).
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premiums. It appears obvious that this section-by placing a
ceiling of $250,000 on the recovery of noneconomic
damages-is rationally related to the objective of reducing
the costs of malpractice defendants and their insurers. 
87
Since the connection between caps on noneconomic damages and medical
malpractice costs is "obvious," MICRA is able to meet the "rational basis"
demands of both the due process clause and the equal protection clause. The
ease with which California finds the "rational" connection between the cap
and the legislative objective is an intriguing contrast to the analysis of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, which was much pickier and less deferential to the
legislature in Ferdon. Perhaps this suggests a more deferential atmosphere
for California on this issue, one in which legislatures are free to experiment
with possible solutions to perceived "crises."
At the other end of the spectrum, Texas' history with this issue is quite
different, and arguably more complex. For instance, the first thing that stands
out about Texas' stance on noneconomic damage caps is that there is
absolutely no question that such caps are valid. The Texas Constitution says
so.88 Article III, section 66(b) of the Texas Constitution states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution,
the legislature by statute may determine the limit of liability
for all damages and losses, however characterized, other than
economic damages, of a provider of medical or health care
with respect to treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed
departure from an accepted standard of medical or health care
or safety, however characterized, that is or is claimed to be a
cause of, or that contributes or is claimed to contribute to,
disease, injury, or death of a person. 89
This section of the Texas Constitution was passed in 2003.90 As a result
of this constitutional provision, Texas courts do not have to debate the validity
of noneconomic damage caps under their own state law. If nothing else, this
helps avoid state-specific questions of validity encountered in Wisconsin (as a
result of Wisconsin's "right to remedy" provision in article I, section 9 of the
87. Fein, 695 P.2d at 680 (emphasis supplied).
88. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 66(b).
89. Id.
90. Tex. Med. Ass'n, Texans Vote "Yes on 12 " http://www.texmed.org/Template.aspx?id=28-
19 (last visited Jan. 10, 2006).
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Wisconsin Constitution) and Illinois, among other states.
Texas' position on noneconomic damages was not always so cut-and-dry,
however. When the Texas Supreme Court was instructed to answer certified
questions in Lucas v. United States, 9' the Texas appellate courts were split on
the issue of whether damage caps in medical malpractice cases were valid.
92
In Lucas, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had already
determined that noneconomic damage caps in medical malpractice cases pass
federal requirements of due process and equal protection; 93 thus, the question
presented to the Texas Supreme Court was whether the caps violate state law.
At the time Lucas was decided, the Texas Constitution was much more
favorable to medical malpractice plaintiffs. Not only did the express grant of
authority of article III, section 66(b) not exist, but article I, section 13 of the
Texas Constitution provided medical malpractice plaintiffs with more
ammunition than the typical equal protection and due process arguments.
Article I, section 13 states, in part, that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every
person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law.",94 Therefore, the then-existent $500,000
cap on noneconomic damages still had to survive the scrutiny of Texas state
law.
The Lucas court struck down the cap, and did so by focusing on the nature
of the legislation. 95 For instance, the fact that there was no alternate remedy
to compensate injured plaintiffs was taken into consideration by the court.96
In addition, the court analyzed the purposes and bases of the statute.
97
Specifically, the court noted that the legislation sought to control insurance
rates. 98 Considering this main purpose, and the nature of noneconomic
damages limits, the court found that "it is unreasonable and arbitrary to limit
[plaintiffs'] recovery in a speculative experiment to determine whether
liability insurance rates will decrease." 99  Since "article I, section 13,
guarantees meaningful access to the courts whether or not liability rates are
high[,]" the cap was struck down. '00
91. 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988).
92. Id. at 690.
93. Id. at 688; see also Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 421-22 (5th Cir. 1986).
94. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
95. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 692.
96. Id. at 691 ("It is significant to note that in two of the jurisdictions in which damage caps
were upheld, the fact that alternative remedies were provided weighed heavily in the decisions.").
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (emphasis in original).
100. Id.
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Of course, this was not the end of the battle in Texas. After years of
debate over the issue, the war between malpractice cap proponents and
opponents forged ahead until the enactment of Proposition 12, which resulted
in article III, section 66(b). For the time being, it appears the debate is over in
Texas.
The debate is not over in Illinois, a state that has made several efforts to
limit damages in medical malpractice cases. As early as 1976-almost a
decade before Wisconsin enacted caps-the Illinois Supreme Court was
considering whether an overall cap on compensatory damages in medical
malpractice cases, not limited to noneconomic damages, violated the Illinois
Constitution.'01 In Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Ass 'n, 10 2 the Illinois
Supreme Court held that it did, explaining "that limiting recovery only in
medical malpractice actions to $500,000 is arbitrary and constitutes a special
law in violation of section 13 of article IV of the 1970 Constitution." 0 3
A more recent development, and perhaps more recognizable, began in the
1990s with new efforts by the Illinois Legislature. In 1995, the Illinois
Legislature changed the law and limited noneconomic damages to $500,000
not just in medical malpractice cases, but "[i]n all common law, statutory or
other actions that seek damages on account of death, bodily injury, or physical
damage to property based on negligence[.]" 104
This law reached beyond the bounds of many tort reform caps seen
throughout the country, and of course, was challenged. When these questions
worked their way up the Illinois judicial ladder, it became clear that Illinois'
current approach to caps could not be more different than Wisconsin's
approach in Guzman, or than California's approach in Fein.
The landmark case in Illinois, Best v. Taylor Machine Works,105 illustrates
this assertion. In that case, Illinois' cap was challenged on a variety of
grounds, two of which particularly caught the eye of the Illinois Supreme
Court. 106 Like the Texas Supreme Court did in Lucas, the Best court began its
analysis by examining the purpose of the cap. 10 7 By its own terms, the law
claims that capping noneconomic damages "will improve health care in rural
Illinois," and that "the cost of health care has decreased" in states that have
101. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1072 (Il. 1997) (explaining Wright v.
Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976)).
102. 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976).
103. Id. at 743.
104. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115.1 (1996).
105. 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997).
106. See id. at 1068.
107. Id. at 1067.
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already limited noneconomic damages. 10
8
With these purposes and findings in mind, the Illinois Supreme Court
analyzed the cap in the context of the special legislation clause of the Illinois
Constitution. 0 9 Article IV, section 13 of the Illinois Constitution states that
"[the legislature] shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or
can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable
shall be a matter for judicial determination."" 0 "[T]he purpose of the special
legislation clause is to prevent arbitrary legislative classifications that
discriminate in favor of a select group without a sound, reasonable basis.""'
Interestingly, the special legislation clause "generally is judged under the
same standards applicable to an equal protection challenge"-that is, in this
instance, "the rational basis test."' 12  Given the way "rational basis"
challenges have gone in other states (California, for instance), one would
suspect that Illinois could easily uphold the caps as a rational response to a
perceived state problem with malpractice insurance.
The Illinois Supreme Court took a different approach. Instead of casting
off these caps as being rationally related to an insurance problem, the court
considers whether the "arbitrary classifications" have a "reasonable
connection" to the purpose of the cap. 113 To sum up their analysis, the court
explains that "[t]he legislature is not free to enact changes to the common law
which are not rationally related to a legitimate government interest,"' 14 and
thus, the cap violates article IV, section 13 of the Illinois Constitution. As
with Ferdon in Wisconsin, the caps failed rational review.
The "special legislation" clause was not the only reason that these caps
are unconstitutional, the Best court reasoned. 15 The Best court also
invalidated the cap on the basis of the separation of powers clause of the
Illinois Constitution. 116 Because "courts are constitutionally empowered, and
indeed obligated, to reduce excessive verdicts where appropriate[,]" the cap
unconstitutionally intrudes upon the court's power to reduce damages by
operation of law. 117
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1069.
110. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
111. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1069-70.
112. Id. at 1070-71.
113. Id. at 1075.
114. Id. at 1077.
115. Id. at 1078.
116. Id. The separation of powers clause can be found in article II, section 12 of the Illinois
Constitution.
117. Id. at 1081.
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The Best court declined to address other challenges to the caps, since the
court had held them invalid on these two grounds. "8 But despite the Illinois
Supreme Court's take on the matter, Illinois continues to strive for caps on
noneconomic damages; Illinois passed more tort reform legislation in 2005,
resulting in a $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice
cases against physicians, and a $1 million cap against hospitals. 119 Given the
precedent of Illinois law on the matter, one wonders whether this law will
withstand inevitable legal challenges.
Looking at the different views of these states, one might say that Illinois
was as quick to strike down these caps as California was to uphold them,
which raises a glaring question-how can two states take such drastically
different approaches to tort reform issues, when the underlying laws are so
similar? For that matter, before Ferdon, Illinois and Wisconsin seemed like
polar opposites on this issue. How could two states, so close in geography
and so intermingled in population, have taken such drastically different
approaches to tort reform issues?
IV. THE VALIDITY OF CAPS ON NONECONOMIC DAMAGES-WHAT
MAKES TEXAS, ILLINOIS, OR WISCONSIN VICTIMS SO DIFFERENT?
Wisconsin's stance on noneconomic damage caps before Ferdon certainly
was at odds with that of the Supreme Courts of Illinois and Texas. However,
California seems to be equally confident in the opposite conclusion. Why is
there so much variation between these courts, when the issues are so similar?
There are several possibilities. The first, easiest, and most cynical
explanation is that judges are just voting their own preferences and that the
validity of these caps is determined by the political makeup of the courts.
Although this suggestion may seem superficial, there might be some support
for it. For example, both the Best and Lucas courts at least vaguely mention
or evaluate the purpose and effectiveness of these caps. ' 20 Certainly, the
Ferdon court was willing to do so.121 The Supreme Court of Ohio has done
the same, striking down a cap on damages when there was a lack of "evidence
that the damage cap has been a factor in medical malpractice insurance rate
118. Id.
119. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1706.5 (2006).
120. Best, 689 N.E.2d 1075 (addressing Plaintiff's argument that the caps create classifications
that "have no reasonable connection to the stated legislative goals"); see Lucas v. United States, 757
S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988 (finding that it is unreasonable and arbitrary to limit their recovery in a
speculative experiment to determine whether liability insurance rates will decrease).
121. See supra note 71.
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setting."' 122  In essence, these courts are discussing and ruling on the
effectiveness of the law, rather than on the validity of its existence.
In such cases, one may certainly argue that it at least appears that the
courts may be substituting their own judgment for that of the legislature.
Indeed, in his dissent in Ferdon, Justice Prosser brought up this issue openly
in stating that "the majority marshals non-Wisconsin studies and articles to
undermine decisions made in and for Wisconsin by our legislature. The use
of these studies is selective, not comprehensive, so that non-Wisconsin studies
that would support our legislation are played down, overlooked, or
disregarded."
' 123
There certainly are additional explanations, however. A more substantive
possibility is the precise differences in state constitutional requirements, and
what kind of "teeth" these requirements have been given by state courts.
While challenges based on principles found in the United States
Constitution-such as due process and equal protection-are common,
federal interpretation of these doctrines make it difficult for plaintiffs to
succeed on these grounds. For example, when Lucas was before the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the court rejected challenges based on federal due
process and equal protection. 124 In doing so, it quoted the United States
Supreme Court, which has explained:
[O]ur cases have clearly established that "[a] person has no
property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law.
The Constitution does not forbid the creation of new rights,
or the abolition of old ones recognized by the common law, to
attain a permissible legislative object," despite the fact that
"otherwise settled expectations" may be upset thereby.
Indeed, statutes limiting liability are relatively commonplace
and have consistently been enforced by the courts. 125
This language caused the court in Lucas to reject any challenge based on
federal due process. 126 Likewise, federal equal protection arguments are often
quickly thrown out, as courts tend to hold that noneconomic damage caps
122. Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 771 (Ohio 1991).
123. Ferdon ex. rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125, 209, 284 Wis. 2d
573, 209, 701 N.W.2d 440, 209.
124. Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 421-22 (5th Cir. 1986).
125. Id. at 422 (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 n.32
(1978) (emphasis in original)).
126. Id.
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satisfy the "rational basis" test. 127  While state courts are certainly free to
interpret any due process or equal protection clause in their own state
constitution much more liberally, courts have often refused to do so.1
28
On the other hand, state-specific constitutional provisions have been the
basis for invalidating these caps in several instances. 129  For example, the
Texas and Illinois Supreme Courts invalidated these caps through the
interpretation of their own unique state constitutional provisions. Wisconsin,
on the other hand, has held that its state-specific "right-to-remedy" provision
"confers no legal rights."'' 30  Therefore, if there are no rights given to
plaintiffs by this provision of the Wisconsin Constitution, then it is hard to
argue that their right is being violated in this context.
Finally, prior precedent may be another explanation for each state's
individual stance. For example, while the Best, Lucas, and Fein courts
generally resolved the constitutional issues on an independent basis, the
Guzman court felt that it was significantly hampered by prior precedent. 131
The thrust of this view is that the constitutional issues confronted in Guzman
can be decided in light of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Aicher
v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund.132  In Aicher, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court considered whether Wisconsin's five-year statute of repose in
medical malpractice situations 133 was constitutional. The court found that it
was, noting that the statute of repose "do[es] not violate the right-to-remedy
provision of the Wisconsin Constitution . . . [and does] not offend equal
protection because the classification of minor medical malpractice claimants
is related rationally to the legitimate legislative objectives of reducing health
care costs." 1
34
This determination was vitally important to the Guzman decision. As the
court explains, if arbitrarily cutting off the right to bring one's suit for medical
127. See, e.g., id.; see also Knowles v. United States, 829 F. Supp. 1147 (D.S.D. 1993); Samsel
v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., 789 P.2d 541 (Kan. 1990).
128. See, e.g., Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 116 (Md. 1992) (stating that the cap on
noneconomic damages "does not violate the equal protection component of Article 24 of the
Declaration of Rights"); Adams v. Children's Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. 1992); Robinson
v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 414 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1991).
129. See, e.g., Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997); Lucas v. United
States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988).
130. Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, 43, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 43, 613
N.W.2d 849, 43 (citations omitted).
131. See generally Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp., 2001 WI App 21, 6 n.4, 240 Wis. 2d 559,
6 n.4, 623 N.W.2d 776, 6 n.4 ("Wisconsin precedent not only illuminates our analysis, it controls
it.").
132. 2000 WI 98, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849.
133. WIS. STAT. § 893.55(l)(b) (2003-2004).
134. Aicher, 2000 WI 98, 6, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 6, 613 N.W.2d 849, 6.
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malpractice (as a statute of repose essentially does) passes constitutional
muster, then merely limiting one's damages at an arbitrary point certainly
does the same. 135  Considering this reasoning, Wisconsin's decisions
validating the statute of repose for medical malpractice cases certainly had a
great effect on how Wisconsin decided to confront the issue of damage caps
(that is, before the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided the issue in Ferdon).
While these possible explanations may shed light on how Wisconsin got
to where it is, where Wisconsin will go (and should go) in the future is an
entirely different question, involving several different issues. Has Wisconsin
chosen the "right" side in the malpractice debate? If so, has it done so in the
right fashion? Have these caps helped the medical malpractice "crisis?" How
has the medical malpractice field changed after so many states have already
chosen their sides? A thorough analysis of the effect that caps on
noneconomic damages have had on malpractice premiums, health care costs,
and health care access can help illuminate the answers to these questions.
V. THE FUTURE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DAMAGES IN WISCONSIN-
WHAT SHOULD WISCONSIN DO?
A. Do Caps Really Work?
As we have seen, courts that strike down noneconomic damage caps
sometimes discuss their effectiveness at controlling malpractice rates or health
care costs, while courts that uphold these caps either assume the connection or
decline to discuss it entirely. Do these caps on noneconomic damages help
control medical malpractice premiums and health care costs? Do they
encourage business, improving access to the health care system? If so, why
are some states so willing to invalidate these laws? If not, is it up to judges or
legislators to take action?
As with other debates of this nature, there are staunch supporters and
135. Guzman, 2000 WI App 21, 12, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 12, 623 N.W.2d 776, 12. The court
stated the following:
Significantly, Aicher upheld the right of the legislature to deprive a person
injured by medical-malpractice of any right of recovery if that person brings
suit after expiration of the five-year statute of repose, even though he or she
might not have discovered the injury until after the repose period had passed.
There can be no more drastic deprivation of the right to have one's suit for
medical-malpractice damages tried by a jury than what the trial court in Aicher
characterized as closing the doors of the courtroom before the child in that case
"'even discovered she was injured."'
Id. (citations omitted).
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opponents, both who throw out interesting arguments supporting whichever
side they are on. The majority in Ferdon was certainly not at a loss for facts
and statistics to prove its point, and neither was Justice Prosser in his dissent,
for that matter. 
136
One main thrust behind these caps is, of course, the stabilization of
medical malpractice insurance premiums. The logic is that by capping
noneconomic damages, malpractice insurance will become more affordable.
However, there is evidence to show that this is not the case. For instance,
according to a study conducted by Weiss Ratings, Inc. in 2003, while many
states have enacted caps to deal with medical malpractice insurance
premiums, "the actual experience of the states with caps does not support
these proposals."137 Over a twelve-year period (1991-2002), states with caps
experienced a 48.2% increase in the median annual premium, while states
without caps experienced only a 35.9% increase. 138 As the study suggests,
On the surface, the theory behind caps on non-economic
damage awards seems logical: caps would limit the payouts
by insurers, and the lower payouts, in turn, would naturally
enable the insurers to reduce med mal premiums. As we shall
demonstrate below, however, in the real world of the med
mal insurance business, only the first half of this theory is
working. 1
39
In other words, the connection that was so obvious in Fein may not be as
clear when the numbers are crunched.
The Weiss Ratings, Inc. study, while pretty indicative, is not the only
evidence that suggests this conclusion, however. In several cases, insurance
companies have also raised premiums at an alarmingly high rate despite a cap
being in place. For example, after the Texas Constitution was amended and
the legislature was allowed to impose a cap, major insurers sought a premium
increase of up to thirty-five percent for doctors and sixty-five percent for
hospitals. 140  Florida, Mississippi, Nevada, and Oklahoma all experienced
136. See generally Ferdon ex. rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125,
199, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 199, 701 N.W.2d 440, 199.
137. Weiss, Gannon & Eakins, supra note 75, at 3.
138. Id.
139. Id at 7.
140. Ams. for Ins. Reform, Limiting Liability Will Not Fix Insurance Problems, 1 (Apr. 2004),
http://insurance-reform.org/pr/AIRCaps%20then%2ORate%2OHikes.pdf. See also Darrin Schlegel,
Some Malpractice Rates to Rise Despite Prop. 12, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, (Nov. 19, 2003), available
at http://www.houstonpsychiatry.org/houstonpsychiatry/1069351043/Malpractice%20Rates%20%2-
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similar requests or rate hikes shortly after passing tort reform legislation,14,
Nevada doctors have even described the Nevada cap on noneconomic
damages as a "colossal failure." 1
42
Interestingly, the insurance industry's own testimony may render these
facts academic. For one, the American Insurance Association, in criticizing
an unfavorable report on state tort reform laws, claimed that "[i]nsurers never
promised that tort reform would achieve specific savings, but rather focused
on the benefits of fairness and predictability."'' 43  Not only this, but an
October 2004 press release from the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer
Rights states that GE Protective, the country's largest medical malpractice
insurer, admitted that damage caps will not lower malpractice premiums.1
44
With these facts and admissions, it is difficult to see how caps on
noneconomic damages will help any malpractice insurance "crisis." Even
with the relative stability achieved in California, major questions arise over
whether it has been insurance reform, not the imposition of caps, that has
made the difference. 145
Similarly, the evidence suggests that caps on noneconomic damages have
not had an adverse effect on health care costs. According to the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), malpractice costs account for about two
percent of health care spending. 146 Therefore, any savings that is provided by
caps on noneconomic damages would be miniscule, considering the breadth
of health care spending in the United States.
Tort reform supporters often argue that unlimited liability results in
practicing defensive medicine, which further increases the costs of the
nation's health care system. However, the connection between caps and
OChronicle%2011-19-03.txt.
141. Ams. for Ins. Reform, supra note 140, at 1.
142. Steve Kanigher, 18 Months after Law Enacted, Doctors Say it Hasn't Worked, LAS VEGAS
SUN (Feb. 27, 2004), http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/suri2004/feb/27/516433529.html.
143. Ams. for Ins. Reform, AIA Cites Fatal Flaws in Critic's Report on Tort Reform (Mar. 13,
2002), http://www.aiadc.org/docframe.asp?docid=7027.
144. The Found. for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights, Nation's Largest Medical Malpractice
Insurer Declares Caps on Damages Don 't Work, Raise Docs' Premiums 1 (Oct. 26, 2004),
http://www.iltla.com/Medical%20Malpractice/FTCRMedMal_10_26_04.pdf.
145. The Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights, Testimony of Harvey Rosenfield
Before the House Energy and Commerce Committee Subcommittee on Health 2 (Feb. 27, 2003),
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/healthcare/rp/rp003196.pdf. According to the Foundation for
Taxpayer and Consumer Rights, California enacted Proposition 103 in 1988, which set forth several
insurance reforms (such as frozen rates and mandatory rollbacks). Id. From 1975 (when MICRA
was enacted) until 1988, medical malpractice premiums in California rose 450%. Id. From 1988
until 2001 (similarly, a 13 year period), medical malpractice premiums in California went down two
percent). Id.
146. Congressional Budget Office, Limiting Tort Liability for Medical Malpractice 1 (Jan. 8,
2004), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4968/01-08-MedicalMalpractice.pdf.
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defensive medicine is not as clear as it may appear on the surface. As the
CBO has said, "so-called defensive medicine may be motivated less by
liability concerns than by the income it generates for physicians or by the
positive (albeit small) benefits to patients."1 47 As a result, the "CBO believes
that savings from reducing defensive medicine would be very small." 
148
A final prong of the medical malpractice "crisis" is the fear that unlimited
liability will result in a declining availability of health care. If high premiums
and "frivolous" litigation do not chase doctors away, the fear of unlimited
liability will.
The connection is not quite as strong as one might think. For instance,
Illinois' system prior to enacting new caps in 2005 was of unlimited liability
is oft criticized by tort reform supporters. But statistics from July of 2004
suggest that unlimited liability may not necessarily lead to an exodus of health
care providers in that state. According to the Chicago Tribune, "state figures
indicate that there has been a steady increase in the number of doctors
licensed by the state in recent years-even in high-risk specialty fields in
which doctors reportedly were leaving Illinois." 1
49
Alternative reasons for physician relocation, while less publicized, may
present a more fulfilling explanation. Dr. Anthony Robbins, a doctor who has
overseen programs to address recruitment and retention issues, has offered his
opinion on the subject. Robbins claims the following:
The difficulty in recruiting talented physicians to serve in
rural areas is a nationwide problem. . . . It is a continuing
problem and one that has nothing to do with changes in
malpractice premiums[;] ... shortages in the number of rural
physicians nationwide are due to ... [social and professional]
isolation, the lack of hospitals and medical technology, and a
desire for greater affluence. 150
With this in mind, one cannot say for certain that malpractice insurance
alone is causing any physician shortages that may occur throughout the
country.
147. Id. at 6.
148. Id.
149. Christi Parsons & Bruce Japsen, Physician Count Clouds Malpractice Argument, CH-I.
TRI3., July 16, 2004, § 3, at 1.
150. Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of Am., Are Doctors Really Leaving? (Jan. 27, 2003),
http://www.atlanet.org/public/colunms/1 2-19medmaldoctorsnotleaving.aspx.
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B. What Is the Right Approach?
This evidence, while important and telling, surely is not the end of the
road for the medical malpractice debate. Cap supporters undoubtedly can
point to data suggesting that caps are the answer. However, given all of the
above facts and figures, there can be no denying that there is at least a
legitimate debate about the issue; not over whether caps are right or wrong,
but whether caps even accomplish their goal in the first place. Granting that
both sides may have legitimate arguments, there is only one conclusion to
date: nobody is sure. That being the case, the responsible approach is to err
on the side of medical malpractice victims' right to recovery. After all, if our
civil justice system aims to make victims of negligence whole again, it would
be counter-productive to circumvent that goal through laws that, in the end,
may not do enough good to be worthwhile.
But who should take the initiative to make sure these caps are not in
place? Should courts strike down these laws, ensuring that malpractice
victims are fully and fairly compensated? Or should the legislature reconsider
their policy, noting the questionable connection between noneconomic
damage caps and malpractice insurance rates?
Given the nature of some decisions that have struck down these damage
caps (especially those by the Illinois Supreme Court, the Texas Supreme
Court, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court), it appears that the safest way of
taking action to remove these caps is through legislative decision making.
When courts begin to analyze the effectiveness of a law in order to rule on its
validity (as was arguably done in Best and Ferdon), the temptation for judges
to insert their own beliefs becomes too great; the court, in arguing over the
effect of the law rather than the validity of it, may inevitably become a super-
legislature. Whether the legislature has the power to pass the law should not
depend on the wisdom or success of the law. In essence, the power to
legislate over a subject matter also includes the power to legislate poorly.
The safer, correct path to remove these caps is to eliminate them through
the legislative process. The legislature, after all, is in a better position to
investigate, analyze, and consider whether these caps truly help the general
population. Therefore, considering both the questionable effect of
noneconomic damage caps on malpractice premiums and the insufferable
results that it has on many victims of malpractice, the Wisconsin Legislature
must carefully consider its efforts in enacting medical malpractice legislation.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Limiting noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases has
traditionally been a strongly protected policy of the State of Wisconsin.
However, the Ferdon case has turned medical malpractice law upside-down in
Wisconsin, and done so in an interesting if not threatening way. The
willingness of courts to look at the effectiveness of certain laws to determine
the validity of those laws is troubling, and may not be the proper role for the
judiciary.
In any event, the effectiveness of medical malpractice caps is
undoubtedly in question. Yet, the harsh results that these caps yield on certain
victims of malpractice are certain. Therefore, the Wisconsin Legislature must
carefully consider the effectiveness and impact of these caps before
attempting to enact new laws that limit the rights of medical malpractice
victims. Cutting off a victim's right to full recovery is a high price to pay in
the name of an insurance crisis; a price that, in the end, may not be worth it.
MICHAEL S. KENITZ
[89:601
